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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, Cuban exports to the United
States held a privileged position in the U.S. market. Many of Cuba’s
exports received at least 20% less in duties than competitors and after
1934, Cuba’s main export—sugarhad a guaranteed quota in the U.S.
market. Yet Cuban and U.S. scholars alike criticize these trade
agreements—specifically the Reciprocity Convention of 19021 and the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 19342—as having condemned Cuba to a
monoculture economy. For example, Zanetti argues that as a result of the
Reciprocity Convention, “the monoculture nature of the Cuban economy
was accentuated to the point that it was deformed.”3 Steward, referring to
*
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**
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1. Commercial Convention Between the United States and Cuba, Cuba-U.S., art. II, Dec.
11, 1902, 33 Stat. 2136, 2137 [hereinafter 1902 Reciprocity Convention].
2. Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Cuba, CubaU.S., Aug. 24, 1934, E.A.S. 67 [hereinafter Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934]; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRIC. BULL. NO. 2, THE AGRICULTURE OF CUBA 39 (1942) [hereinafter
AGRICULTURE OF CUBA].
3. OSCAR ZANETTI, LOS CAUTIVOS DE LA RECIPROCIDAD 89 (2003).
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the 1934 Treaty, concludes “monoculture, not viability was the chief
result of the treaty.”4
Moreover, critics contend that the treaties led to U.S. capital
dominating Cuba’s sugar industry, and that U.S investors in Cuba, along
with mainland sugar refineries, gained the most from the treaties. In
addition, the treaties did little to diversify the Cuban economy, instead
maintaining the country’s food dependence while discouraging its
industrial development. Further, what little export diversification was
achieved, such as the development of non-traditional agricultural exports,
was insignificant and provided few benefits to Cubans.
This paper considers the latter charge—the extent to which these trade
agreements facilitated the development of non-traditional agricultural
exports and whether that development only benefitted U.S. interests. A
considerable literature has examined the first two issues.5 But the
question of export diversification has not yet been examined in much
depth. I do so here by undertaking a detailed analysis of Cuba’s non-sugar
and tobacco exports (NST) to the United States, focusing on the
development of non-traditional exports of fruits and vegetables.
I show that in response to the favorable duty treatment provided by
the 1902 Reciprocity Convention, non-traditional agricultural exports
grew rapidly and that this increase was largely the initiative of American
colonists in Cuba. However, by the 1930s, the colonies were in demise,
and the export of these crops had largely passed to Cuban producers.
Moreover, after the 1934 treaty granted Cuban fruits and vegetables
exports further duty-free treatment, Cuba became the main foreign
supplier of a variety of vegetables to the United States, complementing
its already-existing dominance in grapefruits and pineapples. In addition,
Cuba developed its fruit and vegetable processing industry during this
period, which also contributed to it further diversifying its exports.
Nonetheless, over this period, Cuban exports of NST fresh and processed
agricultural products never amounted to more than 4% of Cuba’s total
exports, largely because of the continued dominance of sugar exports.
The next Part presents an overview of the two trade treaties. After this
overview, I analyze the development of fruit and vegetable exports to the
United States up until the early 1920s as well as the rise and decline of
the American colonies in Cuba. The subsequent section considers the
4. DICK STEWARD, TRADE AND HEMISPHERE: THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY AND
RECIPROCAL TRADE 111 (1975).
5. See, e.g., LELAND HAMILTON JENKS, OUR CUBAN COLONY: A STUDY IN SUGAR (Arno
Press 1970) (1928); ARTHUR MACEWAN, REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CUBA
(1981).
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impact of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, the development of
Cuba’s processing industry, and the trajectory of non-traditional exports
until the U.S. embargo on Cuba was imposed. The concluding section
considers why the trade agreements alone did not have a broader impact
on the diversification of Cuban exports.
II. THE RECIPROCITY TREATIES
The 1902 Reciprocity Convention between the United States and
Cuba was a quid pro quo for Cuba’s agreement to include the infamous
Platt Amendment in its 1902 Constitution. The Platt Amendment spelled
out eight conditions deemed necessary to withdraw U.S. military forces
from the island after the Cuban-Spanish-American War and to transfer
sovereignty to the Cuban people.6 Among them was the right of the
United States “to intervene in Cuban affairs in order to defend Cuban
independence and to maintain ‘a government adequate for the protection
of life, property, and individual liberty.’”7 Notwithstanding considerable
opposition, the Cuban Constitutional Convention acquiesced when the
McKinley administration “promised them a trade treaty that would
guarantee Cuban sugar exports access to the U.S. market.”8
The 1902 Reciprocity Convention maintained duty free access to the
U.S. market for those products that at the time were being imported from
Cuba free of duty; and it granted Cuba a special 20% reduction on the
duty rates provided for in the 1897 U.S. Tariff Act.9 In return, Cuba ceded
to the United States a similar guarantee to maintain existing provisions
for duty free access for certain items, and duty reductions of 25% to 40%
on a range of products that Cuba imported at the time.10
The main Cuban agricultural exports that entered the U.S. duty free
at this time were cacao, coffee, bananas and plantains, and coconuts.11
For a brief period in the early 1890s, sugar and molasses had been on the

6. Act of Mar. 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 895, 897.
7. The United States, Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, 1901, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/86557.htm
[https://perma.cc/BK78-P2JV]
(last
visited July 27, 2017) (quoting Act of Mar. 2).
8. Id. See also ZANETTI, supra note 3, for a detailed treatment of those in favor and against
the Platt Amendment and the Reciprocity Convention both in Cuba and in the United States.
9. 1902 Reciprocity Convention, supra note 1, at art. II.
10. Id. at art. IV, scheds. A–D.
11. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES FORMING THE TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD IN EACH YEAR FROM 1895 TO 1905, at 76–77 (1906).
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free list, but the 1894 Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act rescinded this status.12
Thus, the primary immediate benefit to Cuba from the 1902 Reciprocity
Convention was the 20% reduction on the duty on sugar, which allowed
Cuba’s main export to gain market share. Cuba’s share of U.S. sugar
imports increased from 35% in 1900–03, to 91% a decade later, and to
98% by 1922–25.13 The European sugar beet industry and the Dutch East
Indies and British West Indies cane sugar exporters suffered most of the
loss.14
The 1913 Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act sharply lowered U.S.
tariffs across the board, and provided an additional incentive for
production and export of non-traditional commodities from Cuba.15
However, this potential stimulus was relatively short-lived. The FordneyMcCumber Tariff Act of 1922 raised the average duty on all U.S. imports
to 14% from the 9.1% that had prevailed under the Underwood-Simmons
Tariff Act.16 Then, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 increased duties
to the levels prevailing at the beginning of the century, with the average
duty reaching 19.6% in 1932.17 As partial cause and consequence of the
Great Depression, trade between the United States and Cuba as well as
global trade subsequently contracted severely.
The 1934 Reciprocal Agreement between the United States and Cuba
was one of eleven reciprocal agreements with Latin American countries
(out of a total 16 such agreements) that the United States negotiated
between 1934 and 1940 with the explicit aim of increasing U.S. exports.18
Although not the initial intent, these reciprocal agreements have come to
be seen as the economic arm of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy in the
hemisphere, a policy initiative that provided many Latin American
countries with a potential way out of the Great Depression through
increased trade. The rationale responded as much to the deteriorating U.S.
trade position in the region as to Latin America’s falling purchasing
power.19
12. ALFRED E. ECKES, JR., OPENING AMERICA’S MARKET: U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
SINCE 1776, at 74 (1995); see also Tariff of 1894, 28 Stat. 509, sched. E.
13. U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, THE EFFECTS OF THE CUBAN RECIPROCITY TREATY OF 1902 tbl.12
(1929).
14. See, e.g., id. at tbl.13. Cuba also supplied a growing share of U.S. domestic
consumption requirements. While sugar imports from Cuba more than doubled between 1910–13
and 1922–25, supplies from the non-contiguous territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands and the Philippines grew by only 42% over this period. See id. at tbl.12.
15. ECKES, supra note 12, at 85.
16. Id. at 88, 107 tbl.4.1.
17. Id. at 107 tbl.4.1.
18. STEWARD, supra note 4.
19. See id. at 21. Between 1929 and 1932 the value of U.S. exports to the region declined
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The reciprocal agreement with Cuba was the first that went into effect
and it differed from others negotiated in this period in that it maintained
Cuba’s special trading relationship with the United States and it did not
include most-favored-nation treatment. Hence, the negotiations for the
Cuban agreement did not have the objective of promoting freer world
trade as did the other agreements, but rather, the Cuban agreement
focused specifically on bilateral concessions aimed at containing
economic and political instability.20 As a monoculture economy
dependent on sugar exports for foreign exchange, the Great Depression
and the associated fall in the price and volume of sugar exported hit Cuba
particularly hard. Whereas in 1924 Cuba had been the United States’ sixth
largest export market, by 1933 it ranked sixteenth.21 Moreover, U.S.
investments in Cuba were exceeded only by U.S. investments in
Canada.22 As Steward argues, “The United States was well aware that
Cuba needed stability and prosperity to safeguard U.S. investments in
Cuba.”23
Negotiations over the trade agreement took place as the U.S.
Congress was once again revising U.S. sugar policy. The May 1934
Jones-Costigan Act assured Cuba a fixed quota of 1.9 million short tons
of sugar in the U.S. market and reduced the duty for Cuban sugar from
that stipulated in Smoot-Hawley of 2 cents to 1.5 cents per pound.24 The
final U.S.-Cuba Reciprocal Trade Agreement of September 1934
included a further concession on sugar, reducing the duty to 0.9 cents per
pound.25
Besides reaffirming Cuba’s 20% duty preference granted in the 1902
Reciprocity Convention, the 1934 treaty gave many Cuban fruit and
vegetable exports even greater preferential treatment during the U.S.
winter season, providing minimum concessions of from 40% to 50%.26 A
few products received an additional duty concession year-round, such as
by 78%, while imports from Latin America declined by 68%. Besides the decline in the absolute
volume of trade, the sharp fall in price of many Latin American export commodities also eroded
its purchasing power. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 89.
22. Id. at 93.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 108.
26. Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934, supra note 2, at sched. II. Cuba’s vegetables
could be planted earlier than in Florida and Texas, thus provisioning the U.S. market when
domestic supplies were low. This pattern had already developed prior to the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement. Roberta P. Wakefield, Some Factors in Cuba’s Foreign Trade, 13 ECON. GEOGRAPHY
109, 109–125 (1937).
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the 40% reduction on Cuban pineapples and a 50% reduction on
processed fruit.27
Cuban concessions to the United States included a reduction in the
duty on food items such as meat, lard, vegetable oils, wheat flour, rice
and potatoes.28 According to Steward,29 Cubans thought Cuba gave up
too much, since the agreement stood to ruin its lard and oil industries, and
because the negotiators failed to regain a quota on Cuban tobacco in the
U.S. market.30
The U.S. Sugar Act of 1937 for the first time created a fixed quota
system based on total U.S. consumption requirements, and it allotted
Cuba allotted 28.6% of the U.S. market.31 According to Steward,32 this
quota amounted to about the same share of Cuban raw sugar but slightly
less of its processed sugar exports. The Cuban government then lobbied
for a further reduction in the sugar duty and a restoration of the tobacco
quota that it had failed to gain in 1934.33 These negotiations resulted in
two additional amendments to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, in
1939 and 1941, which further lowered the duty on Cuban raw sugar and
provided some concessions on tobacco; these amendments also gave
further duty reductions to some U.S. exports to Cuba.34
In the post-World War II period, one of the main U.S. objectives was
to achieve a general liberalization of global trade through the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), negotiated by 23 countries in
1947.35 Cuba understandably worried that it would lose its special
preferences in the U.S. market. As a condition of its joining GATT, Cuba
negotiated an exclusive 1947 agreement with the United States that
supplemented GATT maintaining most of its preferences, and that even
reduced duties further on raw sugar and a number of other items.36
Through the Torquay Trade Agreement of 1951, which was linked to
meeting the provisions of GATT, Cuba benefited from a lowering of U.S.
27. Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934, supra note 2, at sched. II.
28. Id. at sched. I.
29. STEWARD, supra note 4.
30. See ZANETTI, supra note 3, for a similar criticism and a more detailed analysis of the
impact on Cuba of the U.S. sugar policy.
31. ROBERT F. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: BUSINESS AND DIPLOMACY, 1917–
1960, at 168 (1960).
32. STEWARD, supra note 4, at 115.
33. Id. at 115–22.
34. Reciprocal Trade: Second Supplementary Agreement and an Exchange of Notes
Between the United States of America and Cuba, Dec. 23, 1941, E.A.S. 229; Reciprocal Trade:
Supplementary Agreement and an Accompanying Protocol Between the United States of America
and Cuba, Dec. 18, 1939, E.A.S. 165, at 810.
35. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11.
36. SMITH, supra note 31, at 168.
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tariffs on many of its exports and modifications of tariff concessions it
had previously granted the United States.37
Another important change in the post-WWII period was in the method
of calculating the U.S. sugar quota allocation. The U.S. Sugar Act of 1948
provided for fixed annual quotas for U.S. domestic producers and
territories then allocated the remaining amount of projected U.S.
consumption according to percentage quotas.38 Cuba received 98.6% of
this remainder, subject to a guaranteed floor of 28.6% of total U.S.
consumption requirements.39 Congress renewed this system in 1952 and
1956, thus continuing to favor Cuba above other global producers until
July 1960, when President Eisenhower eliminated Cuba’s sugar quota for
the remainder of that year.40 Then in October 1960 the United States
declared an embargo of Cuba (except for food and medicine), 41 and in
January 1961 cut diplomatic relations with the island. The United States
formally rescinded the 1902 Reciprocity Convention in August 1963.42
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA’S NON-TRADITIONAL
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
American colonists in Cuba largely initiated production of citrus,
pineapple, and winter vegetables for the U.S. market.43 Spurred by the
political stability promised by the Platt Amendment and the economic
incentives of the Reciprocity Treaty, and facilitated by the great number
of U.S. land companies that rushed to buy land in Cuba during the U.S.
occupation,44 by the end of the teens there were around 80 American
colonies in Cuba.45 While citrus producers largely concentrated in the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id.
41. 25 Fed. Reg. 10,00613. Congress authorized a complete embargo of trade with Cuba
in September 1961, 75 Stat. 444 (1961), and by February 1962 almost all imports from Cuba had
ceased, 76 Stat. 1446, Pres. Proc. No. 3447.
42. 6 CHARLES I. BEVANS, Reciprocal Trade, in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17761949, at 1198 (1968).
43. See, e.g., LEIDA FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, CUBA AGRÍCOLA: MITO Y TRADICIÓN, 18781920,
at 26364, 29596 (2005). The colonies are referred to in the literature as the “American
colonies,” because the majority were made up of U.S. emigrants, but they also included Canadian,
British, German, and Scandinavian settlers. See also GEORGE RENO, CUBA: WHAT SHE HAS TO
OFFER TO THE INVESTOR OR THE HOMESEEKER (1915).
44. See JENKS, supra note 5, at 14174; see generally Michael E. Neagle, “That
Magnificent Land of Sunshine, Health, and Wealth”: How U.S. Entrepreneurs Sold Cuba’s Isle
of Pines, 11 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 575 (2012).
45. Carmen Diana Deere, Here Come the Yankees! The Rise and Decline of United States
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relatively undeveloped eastern end of the island and on the Isle of Pines,
truck gardening for export principally developed in the western provinces
of Havana and Pinar del Rio, which had rail access to the port of
Havana.46
Table 1 presents a detailed breakdown of Cuba’s NST agricultural
exports during the period of the U.S. occupation (1900–02), immediately
after the implementation of the Reciprocity Convention (1903–05) 47 and
post-WWI (1919–21).48 During these decades relatively low U.S. import
duties prevailed and a number of tropical agricultural products entered
the U.S. duty free. Of the latter, only the value of Cuban exports of
bananas and plantains was of substantial magnitude in 1903-05 and made
up a significant share of U.S. imports. The latter fell from 15% to 4% in
the aftermath of World War I. The Cuban market share of fresh coconuts
also fell precipitously over this period, as did that of cacao.
Cuban cacao production fell after World War I primarily due to the
expansion of sugar cane production.49 During the “Dance of the
Millions,” when sugar prices reached unprecedented heights, cacao trees
were uprooted to make way for cane, and a similar fate may also have
affected coconut groves. Citrus groves in Oriente were uprooted as well,
and even coffee production, which tended to be located in the more
mountainous regions, suffered from the fever to use more land for sugar
production.50 While Cuban coffee exports to the United States show a
slight recovery post-WWI, the value of coffee exports remained quite low
Colonies in Cuba, 1898–1930, 78 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 729, 73031 (1998).
46. FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, supra note 43, at 6667. The establishment of Cuba’s first modern
agricultural experiment station in 1904, the Estación Central Agronómica, in Santiago de Las
Vegas, in Havana province facilitated these latter efforts. U.S. professionals largely staffed the
station up through the teens, and carried out many of the field trials on the farms of colonists in
this region. Id. at 274.
47. Note that the Reciprocity Convention did not go into effect until late December 1903.
That was also the first full year that Cuba was an independent republic and the year by which
Cuban exports had recovered from the War of Independence and even surpassed 1895 export
levels. Cuba’s second War of Independence ran from 1895 to 1898, with the United States
intervening only in 1898, which quickly concluded the war. Reconstruction under U.S. military
rule was a slow process, given the level of destruction in the countryside. Louis A. Pérez,
Insurrection, Intervention, and the Transformation of Land Tenure Systems in Cuba, 1895–1902,
65 HISP. AM. HIST. REV., 229, 234–35 (1985).
48. This three-year average has the advantage of smoothing out any potential impact of the
1919 “Dance of the Millions” when world sugar prices reached unprecedented heights, as well as
the depression of 1920, when sugar prices crashed. JENKS, supra note 5, at 206.
49. FRANCES ADAMS TRUSLOW, REPORT ON CUBA: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA IN
1950, at 823 (1951).
50. Deere, supra note 45, at 75556.
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and the country never regained market share from its main Latin
American competitors.
The positive impact of the Reciprocity Convention can be seen in
terms of the performance of those fruits and vegetables that paid duties
and gained the 20% tariff reduction (shown as ‘dutied’ in Table 1). The
value of ‘all other fruits,’ principally pineapples and grapefruit, almost
tripled from 190305 to 191821. In the early post-WWI period, Cuba
supplied 99% of U.S. imports of pineapples and 95% of grapefruit. The
value of Cuban exports of vegetables also grew spectacularly, although
the magnitude of pineapple exports dwarfed it. In this period, Cuba
supplied 12% of U.S. imports of ‘other vegetables,’ principally winter
truck-garden crops; nonetheless, U.S. imports from Mexico and Canada
dominated this rubric.51
Overall, in 1903–05 some 70% of Cuban agricultural exports other
than sugar and tobacco consisted of duty free traditional products, with
those subject to duties comprising 30%. Post-WWI the decline of
traditional NTS agricultural exports combined with the incentive
provided by a duty differential of 20% reversed this relationship: of the
total annual average of exports to the U.S. market of these products, $3.1
million, traditional NST exports constituted only 30%, and nontraditional exports made up 70%. Thus, one of the beneficial impacts of
the Reciprocity Convention in its initial decades was to broaden and
diversify Cuba’s agricultural exports.
The 1922 Fordney-McCumber Act ushered in a period of higher U.S.
tariffs, which peaked with the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. Cuba, with its
automatic 20% reduction on U.S. tariffs, should have been somewhat
buffered from the full effect of U.S. protectionism as compared to other
foreign suppliers. However, the higher U.S. tariffs of the 1920s
disadvantaged Cuba with respect to domestic producers of similar
commodities, such as Cuba’s budding fresh fruit and vegetable industry.
Duty free items, which consisted of tropical products the United
States did not produce, were the least likely to be affected by rising U.S.
protectionism. Taken together, imports of these traditional NST
commodities from Cuba show steady growth over the decade of the
1920s, led by imports of bananas, with only modest increases in imports
of other duty free fruit, principally avocadoes.52 Nonetheless, Cuba did
51. Unfortunately, disaggregated import data on these ‘other vegetables’ is only provided
from 1934 on.
52. Carmen Diana Deere, The ‘Special Relationship’ and the Challenge of Diversifying a
Sugar Economy: Cuban Exports of Fruits and Vegetables to the United States, 1902 to 1962, tbl.5
(Cuba-U.S. Agric. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1, June 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694831 [https://perma.cc/S3PX-GVBN].
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not manage to significantly increase its market share of these products
over this decade.53
Turning to dutied commodities, while the value of imports of ‘all
other fruits’ increased from an average $1.7 million in 1918–21 to a peak
of $3.2 million in 1922–25; thereafter it declined steadily until the late
1930s.54 This trend mirrors that of fresh pineapple imports from Cuba,
which was the island’s most important non-traditional agricultural
export.55 Grapefruit imports also show a steady decline in the average
value of imports over the decade of the twenties.56 Since Cuba remained
the United States’ main source of foreign imports of these commodities,
this suggests that higher tariffs and more intense domestic competition
most adversely affected these two products in the 1920s. U.S. domestic
production of grapefruit doubled between the early 1920s and 1930s, so
Cuba provided only a negligible share of total U.S. consumption.57
In the 1920s, winter vegetables provided the most spectacular
increase in Cuba’s non-traditional exports to the United States, as their
value more than tripled from 1918–21 to the end of that decade, reaching
an average $1.6 million, with tomatoes accounting for almost half of the
latter value.58 By the late 1920s Cuba supplied 18% of U.S. tomato
imports and 23% of other winter vegetables, principally cucumbers,
eggplant, peppers and okra.59 It was the leading foreign supplier of these
other truck crops, surpassed by Mexico only with respect to tomato
exports.60
Due in part to the impact of higher tariffs—as well as of periodic
quarantines the United States placed on Cuban fruit after the black fruit
fly appeared on the island—many American colonies, particularly those
focused solely on citrus production, went into decline after World War
I.61 Across the island, different factors also contributed to the decline of
the colonies: ferocious hurricanes that particularly affected citrus
production on the Isle of Pines, the 1917 Liberal uprising that led to some
destruction in the colonies of eastern Cuba, the departure of many young
U.S. citizens to fight in World War I, and the rise in land prices during
the Dance of the Millions.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at tbl.6.
Id. at tbls.4, 5.
Id. at tbl.5.
Id.
AGRICULTURE OF CUBA, supra note 1.
Deere, supra note 52, at tbls.4, 5.
Id. at tbl.6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 18.
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In 1930, the Times of Cuba provided a list of the main fruit and
vegetable producers who exported their produce to the United States. It
included only 104 citrus growers, 133 vegetable growers, and 17 mixed
growers. Some 80% of the remaining citrus growers had English
surnames and concentrated on increasingly larger holdings in the Isles of
Pines. Spanish surnames were more prominent among the vegetable
growers, constituting 44% (along with 9% with Japanese surnames who
may also have been Cuban citizens), and these exporters were more
geographically dispersed. Pineapple production, generally based on
medium-size plantations, had also passed to mainly Cuban growers by
this time.
The contraction in U.S. aggregate demand as a result of the Great
Depression led to a fall in the value of Cuba’s exports of fruits and
vegetables to the United States from an annual average of $5.6 million in
the late 1920s to $4.6 million in the early 1930s.62 Interestingly, nontraditional exports suffered greater losses than traditional NST exports,
principally because U.S. banana imports remained relatively stable while
coffee and avocado imports from Cuba increased substantially. 63 The
increase in coffee imports from Cuba stems from the growth of Cuban
domestic production in response to the import-substitution policies that
the country adopted in 1927.64 Cuba’s share of the U.S. coffee market,
nonetheless, remained negligible, while that of bananas increased
marginally.65
Among non-traditional fruit and vegetable exports, fresh pineapple
declined particularly steeply, reflecting both the expansion of U.S.
domestic production and the development of Cuba’s pineapple canning
industry in this period; Cuba also began to export processed fruit.66 The
fall in grapefruit imports may partly reflect other internal factors, such as
declining production from the now aging citrus groves on the Isle of
Pines, which had been planted at the beginning of the century.67 Foreign
competition was not a major factor, since Cuba continued to supply
almost all of U.S. imports of pineapples and grapefruit in the early
1930s.68 In contrast, winter vegetables lost some market share and
overall, the decreased U.S. demand most likely affected those products,
62. Id. at tbl.5.
63. Id.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT
BASIC INFORMATION FOR UNITED STATES BUSINESSMEN 4041 (1956).
65. Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.5.
66. AGRICULTURE OF CUBA, supra note 1, at 61.
67. Id.
68. Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.5.
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in addition to Cuba’s two main traditional exports, sugar and tobacco.69
IV. FROM THE 1934 RECIPROCITY TREATY TO THE 1959 REVOLUTION
The severity of the depression in Cuba was one of the reasons
President Roosevelt urged speedy approval of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade
Agreement.70 The Agreement entered into effect in September of that
year, in time to encourage a spurt in winter vegetable production during
late 1934.71 Recall that this treaty gave Cuba substantial duty reductions
on vegetables and certain fruits during the U.S. off-season.
As Table 2 shows, one of the Treaty’s positive immediate effects was
making Cuba the most important foreign supplier of a broad range of
vegetables, and maintaining its dominance in U.S. grapefruit and
pineapple imports. However, because of continuing stagnant demand for
fresh produce in the United States as the Depression ran its course, the
total average annual value of imports of non-traditional agricultural
exports from Cuba continued to fall in the 1934–37 period and did not
reach its 1922–25 peak again until the post-WWII period.
Another factor that affected the total value of Cuba’s non-traditional
exports was competition from both U.S. domestic producers and Mexico.
U.S. production of fresh fruits and vegetables expanded rapidly from the
1940s on, making Cuba competitive primarily during the off-season in
California, Arizona and Florida, which coincided with the months when
it had special duty concessions. The concentration of these Cuban exports
in a few months of the year also caused marketing problems. The winter
vegetable crop was usually auctioned as a boatload in the New York City
market, often depressing prices below the Cuban wholesale price. In
contrast, U.S. domestic competitors had more stable operations, since
they could sell smaller quantities throughout the growing season and had
more diverse markets.72 The declining Cuban share of foreign imports
such as tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, and pineapple, shown in Table 2,
is primarily due to competition from Mexico.
Graph 1 presents the long-term view of U.S. imports of fresh fruit,
vegetables, and tree crops from Cuba, from 1903 to 1962, in constant
prices. It shows that the most important period of growth of non69. Id.
70. STEWARD, supra note 4, at 92–93.
71. The data for 1934 reported in Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States
is already broken down to reflect imports from Cuba which came in under the special treaty rates
versus the normal 20% duty reduction, demonstrating the immediate impact of the 1934 Treaty.
72. TRUSLOW, supra note 49, at 866.
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traditional agricultural exports was in the first decades of the twentieth
century. After peaking in 1922–25, the contribution of non-traditional
exports stagnated, and then fell after 1959. Traditional NST exports show
a different trend. After falling abruptly in the early decades, they
recovered through the Great Depression, to subsequently fall again
through the early 1950s. The abrupt increase in the mid-1950s was
primarily due to a surge in coffee exports, production that had been
increasing in Cuba since the late 1920s.
The growth of Cuba’s fruit and vegetable processing industry from
the 1930s on provide the bright spot in this story, especially as an industry
that was largely developed by Cubans. Cuba’s first modern pineapple
canning factory dedicated to the export market dates from 1928, and two
others began operations in 1937 and 1939.73 From this period on,
processed pineapple exports to the United States began to gain ground on
fresh pineapple exports. Tomatoes were the main processed vegetable,
with modest volumes of canned tomatoes exported to the United States
when domestic surpluses warranted it.
From 1947 to 1962, the combined value of Cuban exports of
processed fruits, nuts, and vegetables to the United States almost rivaled
that of fresh products.74 With the exception of the early 1950s, the
average annual value of Cuban exports of processed fruits to the United
States exceeded that of fresh fruits, with the dominant product being
prepared and canned pineapple. Moreover, Cuban exports of processed
fruit captured a larger share of the U.S. import market than did fresh fruit,
assisted by the preferential duty reduction of the 1934 Treaty.75
While the fruit and vegetable sub-sector both expanded, diversified,
and generated forward linkages to agro-industrial processing in the postWorld War II period, this sub-sector never constituted more than 4% of
total Cuban exports to the United States, and generally much less. Sugar
and sugar-based products continued to dominate exports, representing
from 81% to 85% of Cuban exports to the United States from 1947 to
1952, and then from 75% to 79% from 1953 to 1960. Tobacco and cigars
followed, constituting between 6% and 9% from 1947 to 1960.76
The relative decline of sugar exports in total Cuban exports to the
United States after 1953 is partly related to the development of new
agricultural and agro-industrial exports in the 1950s, as well as to the
73. JOHN WILLIAM LLOYD, PAN AMERICAN TRADE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRUITS AND
VEGETABLES (1942).
74. Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.10.
75. Id.
76. Id. at tbl.11.
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growth of non-agricultural exports related to mining and manufacturing
activities. The new agricultural sector exports of the 1950s consisted
primarily of livestock by-products and shellfish. However, while rivaling
the fruit and vegetable sub-sector, these new exports never exceeded
much more than 2% of total Cuban imports to the United States.77
The total value of U.S. imports from Cuba reached a historic high of
$518 million in 1958, only slightly exceeding the previous 1947 peak,
though it represented a significant decline in constant 1960 dollars (from
$682 million to $531 million).78 The agricultural and agro-industrial
sector’s share of total Cuban exports to the United States, from the late
1940s to the late 1950s, declined; this share, however, never dropped
below 87% (in 1957), illustrating some of the broader diversification of
the Cuban economy that took place in this period.79
The continuing importance of sugar in the Cuban economy became
starkly apparent in 1960 when the United States cut Cuba’s sugar import
quota, and the value of total Cuban exports to the United States
plummeted to $35 million in 1961 compared to $342 million the previous
year.80 The last imports into the United States from Cuba, during 1963,
were tobacco products that entered the United States prior to the embargo
and were released from custom warehouses later that year.81
V. CONCLUSION
The dominance of sugar in the Cuban economy obscures the
considerable diversification in Cuban agricultural exports to the United
States that took place in the early decades of the 20th century and later,
in the post-World War II period. The 20% discount on U.S. duties
provided by the 1902 Reciprocity Convention served as an important
incentive for both American and Cuban growers to experiment with new
crops and develop non-traditional exports geared to the U.S. market.
As Figure 1 showed, Cuba’s non-traditional agricultural exports to
the United States grew rapidly through the mid-1920s, led by pineapple
and grapefruit exports, commodities in which Cuba became almost the
sole foreign supplier. The growth of U.S. protectionism appears to have
cut short the potential dynamism of these non-traditional fresh fruit and
vegetable exports, combined with the Great Depression, which severely
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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constricted external demand throughout the decade of the 1930s, and
increasing competition from U.S. domestic producers.
Compared with the 1902 Reciprocity Convention, the 1934
Reciprocity Agreement had a smaller positive effect on the production
and export of non-traditional fresh fruit and vegetable exports. Cuba’s
recovery from the Great Depression is more closely associated with the
better performance of the traditional NST exports, such as bananas and
avocados, particularly due to the more favorable terms that sugar
acquired in the U.S. market. While the treaty, which concentrated Cuban
exports in the U.S. winter season, initially created an almost exclusive
market for some vegetable exports, such as cucumbers, eggplants and
okra, Cuba’s share of U.S. imports vacillated considerably, usually
because of competition from Mexico. This particularly impacted the most
important crop in export volume, tomatoes. While Cuban tomato exports
reached a high of 43% of U.S. imports in 1938–1941, after World War II
they never represented more than 9%, irrespective of their privileged U.S.
duty treatment.
The rather flat trajectory depicted in Figure 1 of Cuban nontraditional fresh fruit and vegetable exports from the mid-1920s to the
years immediately preceding the 1959 Revolution raises the question of
why the favorable treatment ceded to Cuban products in the U.S. market
did not create more diversification in Cuban agricultural exports. A
number of factors—both external and internal—explain the overall
underwhelming performance of this sub-sector in terms of the value of
exports achieved.
Among the external factors was vacillating U.S. trade policy over
these sixty years. During periods of high protectionism, Cuba’s special
relationship to the United States somewhat buffered it from foreign
competition. However, increases in U.S. tariff levels made Cuba less
competitive against U.S. domestic producers. In addition, U.S.
production of fruits and vegetables expanded rapidly over this period, as
did the California, Texas, and Florida fruit and vegetable industry lobby.
Moreover, as scientific understanding of fruit and vegetable pests and
diseases improved, the United States implemented new sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations that continually raised the bar on the quality of
imports. These explanations, however, do not shed much light on why
Mexico gained U.S. market share on Cuba in these commodities, a topic
that needs to be explored in more depth.
Internal Cuban policies and dynamics also contributed to the
relatively weak performance of this sub-sector. The policies focused on
creating the conditions for profitable sugar production and exports, and
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to a lesser extent, for tobacco, the second major export. Cuba’s other
traditional agricultural export products, such as coffee, cacao, coconuts,
and bananas, often languished, suffering from neglect. Since these
commodities, along with those from every other country, entered the
United States duty free, Cuba’s exports had to be internationally
competitive to gain market share. Only avocados performed well,
primarily because during most of this period they had exclusive duty free
access to the U.S. market during the off-season for U.S. domestic
production, and eventually would become the star performer of the
traditional NST agricultural exports in the post-World War II period.
The concentration of land, labor, capital, and agricultural research on
sugar stymied diversification in multiple ways.82 In most periods, the
price sugar exports could command in the United States likely made
growing sugar cane more profitable than any other agricultural activity.
Growing cane may also have been less risky than fresh fruit and vegetable
production, providing growers with little incentive to diversify. In
addition, both traditional NST and non-traditional agricultural exports
suffered directly from “sugar mania” as they were displaced whenever
high sugar prices prevailed. Rising sugar prices at various times resulted
in the uprooting of tree crops such as cacao, coffee, coconuts, and citrus,
as well as the conversion of lands in banana and vegetable production to
sugar cane production. These factors partly explain why, even under
favorable tariff concessions for fruits and vegetables, Cuba often lost U.S.
market share to foreign competitors such as Mexico throughout these
sixty years.
From an economic development point of view, the bright spot in the
otherwise discouraging trajectory of non-traditional fresh fruit and
vegetable exports was the backward and forward linkages that these
products generated in the Cuban economy. The value of exports of
processed fruit in the post-World War II period came to rival that of fresh
fruits, while the growth of the domestic vegetable and fruit canning
industry contributed somewhat, if insufficiently, to decrease Cuba’s
dependence on food imports.
Among the lessons that can be drawn from this analysis of Cuba’s
special relationship with the United States from 1903 to 1960 is that
preferential tariffs can be a powerful stimulus, yet by themselves may not
be sufficient to transform a country’s export profile. A number of other
factors need to be in place in order to both develop and sustain the growth
of non-traditional exports, such as agricultural research, and financing
and marketing channels, to mention a few.
82. See generally FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, supra note 43.
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Looking forward to the eventual normalization of U.S.-Cuban trade,
the world is a much different place than in 1959. U.S. tariff levels have
fallen to historic lows and trade agreements have proliferated globally. In
the hemisphere, the United States now has free trade agreements with
Mexico and Canada (NAFTA), Central America and the Dominican
Republic (CAFTA), Chile, Panama, and Colombia. This means that once
the U.S. embargo is lifted, and full U.S.-Cuba trade can resume, Cuba
may find itself in the position of being among the few Latin American
countries facing full tariffs for its products in the U.S. market. Given the
historical record of trade reviewed in this paper, the current privileged
position of Mexico in the U.S. market for fresh and processed fruits and
vegetables may disadvantage Cuba. Whether Cuba will attempt to once
again compete with Mexico in this sub-sector, or focus its efforts on sugar
and sugar by-products, or on non-agricultural sectors in which it holds a
potential comparative advantage, remains the big question.
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Table 1. U.S. Imports of Fresh Fruit, Vegetables and Tree Crops
from Cuba by Duty Status, 1900 to Early 1920s (Current $)83
Product

1900–1902
(av. annual)

Free of duty
Coffee
Cacao
Coconuts
Bananas &
plantains
Other fruita
Sub-total, free
Dutied
All other fruits

Cuban share
of U.S.
imports

Cuban share
of U.S.
imports

4,994
292,347
153,127

negl
5.2%f
22.9%f

6,159
197,709
233,491

negl
3.9%
23.6%

386,316
13,664
850,448

7.2%f
3.9%f

1,299,584
19,060
1,756,003

14.9%
4.3%

239,581
Of which:
Pineapples
Grapefruit
Other citrusb
Otherc
All vegetables
Of which:
Beansd
Peas
Onions &
garlic
Potatoes
Othere
Sub-total,
dutied
Total

1903–1905
(av. annual)

657,923

1918–1921
(av. annual)

Cuban share
of U.S.
imports

28,199
84,110
55,952
683,002

negl
negl
1.7%
3.9%

93,666
944,929

3.8%

1,740,204

n.a.
n.a.
1,391f
238,190
51,632

n.a.
n.a.
negl
18.7%f

n.a.
n.a.
3,007
654,916
99,057

n.a.
n.a.
negl
29.3%

1,213,071
477,200
7,006
42,927c
419,214

99.3%
95.3%
negl
2.1%

2,866f
-

neglf
-

6,048
-

negl
-

105,211
7,833
11,421

1.0%
negl
negl

25,437
6,915f
16,414

6.8%
neglf
5.4%

27,252
5,444
60,313

3.6%
negl
9.4%

49
294,700

negl
12.2%

291,213
1,141,661

756,980
2,512,983

2,159,418
3,104,347

Notes:
“negl” = negligible, less than 1%
a
Other fruit refers largely to avocados which were mostly imported duty free.
b
Oranges, limes and lemons.
c
Primarily avocados on which duty was charged.
d
For 1903, includes dried beans and peas; for 1918-21, dried beans and lentils.
e
Includes tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, peppers, & other fresh vegetables which
are not reported separately until later years.
f
Two-year averages since data for 1900 not available either for imports from Cuba
or for total U.S. imports for that category.
Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.4; compiled from U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1906–1946) (from General
Imports, in multiple volumes).
83
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Table 2. Cuban Share of U.S. Imports of Fresh Fruit and
Vegetables, 1926–195884
Product
1926–
1934–
1942–
1951–
1955–
1929
1937
1946
1954
1958
Pineapple 98.5%
89.6%
62.4%
77.5%
83.9%
Grapefruit 97.0%
99.3%
99.9%
93.9%
96.5%
Beans
negl.
7.0%
15.5%
0.6%
0.2%
Tomatoes 17.6%
39.8%
9.2%
6.4%
8.7%
Cucumber n.a.*
98.3%
79.8%
90.3%
75.7%
Eggplant
n.a.*
94.1%
53.4%
85.8%
53.7%
Okra
n.a.*
99.5%
99.9%
99.5%
99.5%
*: Listed in “other vegetables” of which Cuba supplied 23.3% of U.S.
imports in 1926–1929.

84

Compiled from Deere, supra note 52, at tbls. 6, 9.
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Graph 1: Value of U.S. Imports of Fresh Fruit, Vegetables and
Tree Crops from Cuba, 1903–1962 (in Constant 1960 $)85
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Note: Traditional imports are those that traditionally entered the United
States duty-free; non-traditional are those that paid duty and were subject
to preferential tariffs.
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